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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article presents an analytical and theoretical discussion of
how an artist's artwork should be treated once it enters the global
marketplace. Considering only the visual arts, the answer is short
and simple: this Author believes that all, or at least the better-known
legal systems, uphold the rights granted to the artist when the work
was created. Consequently, the artist retains some rights not only as
the artist's intellectual property, but also in its tangible
manifestation, for example, sculpture or painting-traditionally
called corpus mechanicum-even though he does not own this
particular sculpture or painting anymore. This, however, is only a
simple explanation: the remainder of the problem is decidedly more
complex. Transfer of ownership of the art object to a third party
results in the imposition of the artist's rights on the property rights of
the new owner of the work. In law this phenomenon is not anything
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new or special: similar examples exist in other areas. For example,
when there are adjoining pieces of real estate, property law
differentiates between certain competing neighbors' rights. As is
easily seen, not all rights are created equal; on the contrary, some
rights are mutually exclusive, thus creating areas of potential
conflict. The problem does not exist as long as the artist retains the
ownership of his work and its material embodiment because he is the
only owner of the both aspects of the work. The moment of sale is the
beginning of a hypothetical conflict with the new owner. Sometimes
the hypothetical conflict becomes very real and requires application to
a court for resolution. The judgment in such a case depends on the
legal system in question, but regardless of the jurisdiction, it is often
very difficult to gauge the outcome of such a conflict. Courts are not
uniform in their decisions and the legal systems vary widely-even in
the increasingly global world. This diversity results from, on one
hand, a different appraisal of interests which come into play, and on
the other hand, the enduring nature of some philosophies about
artists' work and the work's purposes. Understanding these
differences is fundamental to understanding the status of an artist
versus the status of his work. Therefore, it is appropriate to start
with some historical background. It will be necessary to concentrate
on so called "moral" and "moral-like" rights; only these rights can be
retained by the artist after the art object has been sold or disposed in
another way.

II. ORIGINS OF ARTISTS RIGHTS
A long time ago there were no ownership conflicts. Millions of
people visit Egypt each year to gaze on the remains of pyramids,
sculptures, and paintings and probably do not realize that the artists
who created these monuments of art were treated as narrow-minded,
anonymous craftsmen; they were respected, at most, as makers of
these wonders, but not as their creators.1 Their work was seen as
pure physical labor and, according to standards of the times, was
disdained. It was difficult, therefore, to even think about artistlaborer rights.
The other reason artistic work was held in such low esteem was
attributable to the place occupied by art in the ancient world. Art was
purely functional in character and was mostly used to show religious
images or to be a tool for propaganda. In such circumstances the
creator of art had to remain completely anonymous and had no

1.

ARNOLD HAUSER, SOZIALGESCHICHTE DER KUNST UND LITERATUR 30 (C. H.

Beck ed., 1967).
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artist's rights. His work did not express his thoughts or emotions, but
rather merely showed his talent and dexterity. It is not surprising
then, that artworks remained in the total control of those who
commissioned them and could be used to advance the commissioner's
and, consequently, could be
current political or religious needs
2
changed or destroyed if necessary.
The view of the artist as a physical laborer was not limited to
Egypt: this perspective on the artist was also typical in Greece, Rome,
and continued through to the Middle Ages. 3 The whole ancient world
could not overcome the contradiction of scorning the laborer who
created the work while praising the objects as beautiful art.4 The
creation of the art had no connection with the higher values of
knowledge and education. Plutarchus stated: "No generous youth,
from seeing the Zeus at Pisa (Olimpia), or the Hera at Argos, longs to
be Pheidias or Polycleitus." 5 Seneca was even more blunt: "Paintings
that depict gods are worshiped and people get on their knees before
them... but look down upon the artists who created them. ' 6 Despite
appreciation for the greatest artists, the law did not forbid copying or
changing the works, because ownership of the art was most
important. To put it in today's terms, art was not perceived as an
"intellectual creation" that could be distinguished from its
embodiment.
Writers, whose work was able to reach a wider audience because
of contracts with publishers, were the first to perceive a problem.
Cicero, in his letters, worried that his works would be published

2.
Id. This practice occurs even today. For example, the media reported that
last year the city council of a Polish city decided to replace the statue of a communist
general with a monument of another hero to be more in tune with the changes taking
place in the country. One of the councilmen proposed that, to save money, all that
needed to be done was to saw off the general's mustache and change the sign. The
sculptor did not protest, perhaps because he did not want a reminder that he was the
one who created the politically incorrect general.
3.
EDGAR ZILSEL, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES GENIEBEGRIFFS: EIN BEITRAG ZUR
IDEENGESCHICHTE DER ANTIKE UND FROHKAPITALISMUS 35 (G. Olms ed., Hildesheim

New York 1972) (1926).
4.
See id.
5.

3 PLUTARCHUS, PLUTARCH'S LIVES: PERICLES AND FABIUS MAXIMUS, NICIAS

AND CRASSUS 5 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984) (1916).
6.
In French, Seneca's original statement reads as follows:
Ils v~n~rent les statues des dieux, ils les supplient A genoux, ils les adorent, ils
restent assis ou debout devant elles pendant une journde enti~re, ils leur
pr6sentent des offrandes, ils leur sacrifient des victimes; et, tout en les
regardant avec tant d'admiration, ils m6prisent les ouvriers qui les ont faites.
2 LACTANCE, INSTITUTIONES DIVINES 14, 39 (Pierre Monat trans., Les Editions du Cerf
1987).
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incorrectly. 7 Horatio was angry at changes to or unauthorized copies
of his works, and Ovidius complained when works were published
without the awareness or consent of their creators. 8 Martialis was the
first to use the word "plagiarism." Authors' criticism of the ownership
scheme continued into the Middle Ages. For example, in the
introduction to the well-known Sachsenspiegel code, Elke von
Repkow reminded his readers of the need to prevent distortion of the
work.9
The situation began to change in the Renaissance, even though
many of the era's artists began as craftsman's apprentices. Leon
Battista Alberti, trying to prove the scientific origin of art, claimed
that art originated in science because knowledge of proportion and
theory of perspective were part of mathematics. 1 Leonardo da Vinci
added that painting stood even higher than science because science
was objective and art was connected to one person and his inborn
abilities.i 1 The consequences of such revolutionary changes were that
artists' sense of dignity grew, and they freed themselves from
complete dependence on their employers and started independent
initiatives. This paved the way to the idea of genius and to an
appreciation of a work of art as a creation of the individual over
tradition, science, or rule.
This shift of priority from work to its creator did not, however,
change the artist's legal situation with regards to ownership. Despite
repeated attempts, Albrecht Durer was not able to prevent other
artists from making and selling copies of his engravings. 12 Direr's
widow was ultimately successful in getting an order from the
Nairnberg town council that forbade the use of Dtirer's signature on
copies of his artwork. 13 Michaelangelo's fresco, The Final Judgment,
commissioned by Pope Julius II della Rovere and painted in the
Sistine Chapel from 1536-1542, was subsequently "amended" by
14
Danielle da Volterra in 1553 during the pontificate of Pope Pius TV.

7.
Stefan Grzybowski, Geneza i miejsce prawa autorskiego w systemie prawa,
in 13 SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO Prawo Autorskie 1-3 (Janusz Barta ed. 2003).
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
HAUSER, supra note 1, at 343.
10.
11.
ALBERT DRESDNER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER KUNSTKRITIK IM ZUSAMMENHANG
DER GESHICHTE DES EUROPAISCHEN KUNSTLEBENS 72 (F. Bruckmann ed., 1915).
12.
Dan Rosen, A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 174 (1983) (exploring how Durer's chosen medium allowed other
artists to copy and sell his works).
13.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 142 (1987).
This occurred because of continuing attacks on the way Michelangelo
14.
painted the saints, which
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The painter covered some exposed body parts on the fresco. It was
only recently that these "cover-ups" were erased during the large
conservation effort undertaken by Pope John Paul II some years
ago. 15 Still, the image of Christ remains with da Volterra's censorship
"additions".
The eighteenth century brought slow changes. Artists, regardless
of their individual styles, shared a profound awareness of the
significance of their art and its mission in the world. 16 William
Hogarth taught morality by painting a series titled The Rake's
17
Progress and created the illustrations Gin Lane and Beer Street.
Fussli shocked the art world when, in 1783, he exhibited The
Nightmare at the Royal Academy.1 8 The artists believed that their art
allowed one to discover the world, experience the present, and
analyze and interpret the human being. Immanuel Kant interpreted
this experience, which until then had been considered a mirror of
reality, as a function of the artist's mind, "[h]is vision [being] 'an
exertion of [his] will."' 19 The Enlightenment artist became a modern
man, a thinker-more than the skilled craftsman or a humble painter
20
of the past.
Simultaneously, the enlightened artist's legal situation changed.
The stimulus for the change was Locke's theory that man has the

led eventually to the decision taken at a session of the Council of Trent at least
to 'emendare' the fresco. Danielle da Volterra, who was given the task of
'censoring,' proceeded with the greatest possible discretion [he was a sincere
and fervent admirer of Michelangelo], and went no further than the covering of
a few figures with drapery, although he could not avoid completely repainting
the figures of St Catherine and St Blaise, which had been singled out
particularly in the attacks.
P. de Vecchi, Michelangelo's Last Judgement, in THE SISTINE CHAPEL: MICHELANGELO
REDISCOVERED 194 (Muller et al. eds., 1986).
15.
Id.
16.
Daniel Arasse, Der Kiinstler, in DER MENSCH DER AUFKLARUNG 214 (M.
Vovelle ed., 1996).
17.
Id.
18.
See NICOLAS POWELL, FOSSLI: THE NIGHTMARE (John Fleming & Hugh
Honour eds., 1972).
19.
GEORGIOS MICHAtLIDtS-NOuAROS, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR 14 (A.
Rousseau & Cie, 1935); ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES
ET CONVERGENCES: ETUDE DE DROIT COMPARE 99 (E. Bruylant ed., 1993); Cheryl
Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of
Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361,
370-71 (1998) (describing Immanuel Kant's role in the evolution of droit moral and
quoting Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 17 (1994)).
20.
Arasse, supra note 16, at 221; see Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and
Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy 817, 839-41 (1990).
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right to the fruit of his labor. 21 In Europe, Wilhelm von Humboldt
noticed art's spiritual aspect, 22 which led Otto Friedrich von Gierke to
observe that creative work was materialized in its results and that
works of art were the reflections of their creator.2 3 Consequently, the
object of art could be treated as an emanation and "extension" of the
artist's personality. 24 The common law system drew more practical
conclusions from Locke's theory. It stipulated that in the process of
sale and exchange of goods, the result of the creator's work could not
be legally taken by other people, such as an employer; this
represented a significant change from the old system where the work
25
was automatically owned by the master.

III. LEGAL FORMULATION OF ARTIST'S RIGHTS

Two approaches to Lockean theory gave rise to two different
legal systems: copyright and droit d'auteur.26 The first system
considers the creator's connection to his creation to be a result of
creative work that reflects the creator's personality and requires
physical and intellectual effort. Therefore, copyright is a general
category that recognizes both the property and personal rights of the
creator. In the droit d'auteur system, the artist's personality is of
foremost importance and is the essence of the relationship between

21.
"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Me, yet
every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no body has any Right to but
himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly
his." John Locke, Two Treaties on Government 305-06 (Peter Leslett ed., 1967) (1690).
Compare Locke's statement with Enfield's statement referring directly to artists,
"labour gives a man a natural right of property in that which he produces: literary
compositions are the effect of labour; authors have therefore a natural right of property
in their works." WILLIAM ENFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON LITERARY PROPERTY 21 (Printed

for Joseph Johnson 1774) (original document on file with author). See Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Mark Rose, The
Author as Proprietor:Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, in
OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 23 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
22.
See Palmer, supra note 20, at 835-37.
23.
Id. at 839; see PIERRE RECHT, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR, UNE NOUVELLE FORME DE
PROPRIETi, HISTOIRE ET THEORIE 82 (1969).
24.
DELIA LIPSzYC, DROIT A'AUTEUR ET DROITS VOISINS 22 (1997); J.A.L.
STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW PROTECTION OF AUTHOR'S WORKS, PERFORMANCES,
PHONOGRAMS, FILMS, VIDEO, BROADCASTS AND PUBLISHED EDITIONS IN NATIONAL,
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW 15-17 (1994); S.M. STEWART & H. SANDISON,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 6 (1989).
25.
See JACQUELINE SEIGNETTE, CHALLENGES TO THE CREATOR DOCTRINE 21

(Egbert J. Dommening & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 1994).
26.
See Rudolf Monta, The Concept of "Copyright"versus the "DroitD'auteur",
32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 177 (1959); Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur and Copyright:
Between History and Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 235.
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the artist and his work. The relationship is not based on the end
result-i.e., the work of art-but on the materialization of the artist's
personality in his creation. In other words, both systems accept the
double spiritual-material nature of the relationship between the
creator and his work. Copyright, however, sees the creation of the
work mainly as an aspect of property-enrichment of the artist as a
result of his work-while droit d'auteur sees it mostly as evidence of
development and expansion of personality or a way to immortalize
27
the personality of the artist.
The copyright system was the first to be set in law. It focused on
the economic effects of creativity. In 1709, England passed the "Act
for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Time
therein mentioned"; 28 America followed with the Copyright Act of
1790.29 In passing the Copyright Act of 1790, Congress acted
pursuant to Article I, Section Eight, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, under which Congress has the "power to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Time to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
30
Writings and Discoveries.
Despite what is often argued, the French Revolution of 1789 did
not much advance the concept of copyright law. Despite destroying
the old order and claiming to support individuality and creativity, in
reality, the Revolution enacted regulations very similar to the above
mentioned English and American policies.31 Droit d'auteur was
defined by La Chapelier in his preparatory report preceding adoption
of the decree of 179332 as la plus sacrge, la plus personnelle de toutes
les propridtds.33 Years would pass before the French courts would
begin to recognize artists' personal rights arising from a deep socio-

27.
See Palmer, supra note 20, at 861.
28.
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
29.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
30.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. For more on the origins of Anglo-American
Copyright, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, in Of Authors and Origins, supra note 30, at 137.
Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and
31.
French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 429 (1999). The first French
decree on copyright was adopted in 1793. Id.
32.
D6cret-loi de la Convention le 19/24 juillet 1793 relatif aux droits de
propri~t6 des auteurs d'6crits en tous genres, des compositeurs de musique, des
peintres et des dessinateurs. For more information on this statute see RECHT, supra
note 23, at 139; Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 143.
33.
Lipszyc, supra note 24, at 17 (quoting Le Moniteur universel, Jan. 15,
1791). This opinion was very similar to the preamble of Statute of Massachusetts of
1789 that stipulated, "[t[here being no property more peculiar a man's own than that
which is produced by the labor of his mind." Id.
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political discussion about ethics and justice, which were subsequently
named droits moraux-moral rights.
Before presenting the earliest French courts' decisions regarding
moral rights it should be emphasized that English courts took rights
of this kind into account much earlier. In the 1769 case Millar v.
Taylor,34 the great eighteenth century English judge, Lord Mansfield,
explicitly stated that printing the work without the author's
permission does not only deprive the author of due income and risk
the dissemination of views that the author no longer holds, but also
deprives the author of the right to have his name on the work, make
corrections, and fix mistakes. 35 After this opinion, Lord Mansfield
was known as the founding father of the moral rights doctrine,
although this concept played little or no role in the subsequent
36
development of copyright in common law countries.
In France, the 1828 decision in Widow Vergne v. Creditorsof Mr.
Vergne was the first in a series of judgments to develop the doctrine
of moral rights. 37 The court did not allow the printing of a manuscript
by a creditor as partial payment of a prior debt.38 The court ruled
that the interests and rights belonged solely to the author or to his
heirs, and only they could make decisions about the work's
39
publication-that is to make use of their droit de divulgation.
Eight years later, the French court recognized the right of
paternity. In the 1836 case, Masson de Puitneuf v. Musard,40 the
court ruled that playing a musical piece at a concert without naming
its composer violated his reputation. A few years later, in Marquam

34.
35.

Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
Id. Lord Mansfield argued, inter alia, that if the author's work is pirated,

he
may not only be deprived of any profit, but lose the expense he has been at. He
is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the
correctness of his own work. He can not prevent additions. He can not retract
errors. He can not amend; or cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate,
and perpetuate the imperfections, to the disgrace and against the will of the
author; may propagate sentiments under his name, which he disapproves,
repents and is ashamed of. He can exercise no discretion as to the manner in
which, or the persons by whom his work shall be published.
Id. at 252-53.
36.
Gerald Dworkin, Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 5 AUSTL.
INTELL. PROP. J. 5, 6 (1994).

37.
Widow Vergne v. Creditors of Mr. Vergne, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Paris, le ch., Jan. 11, 1828, S. Jur. II 1828, 5; see A. BERTRAND, LE DROIT
D'AUTEUR ET LEs DROIT VOISINS 219 (1991); Peeler, supra, note 31, at 447.
38.
Peeler, supra note 31, at 447.
39.
Id.
40.
Masson de Puitneuf v. Musard, Cour d'appeal [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, le ch., Aug. 8, 1836, D. Repertoire de Jurisprudence Prop. Lit. Et Art.,
no. 194 (Fr.).
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v. Lehuby, the court established the right of integrity in a claim filed
by a Protestant author, Marquam, when his publisher omitted
sections relating to religious rights in his history textbook to assure
sales in Catholic schools. 41 Finding that such abbreviations damaged
court required the book's text to be
the author's reputation, the
42
returned to its original form.
As evidenced above, moral rights were established independent
of each other in the first half of the nineteenth century. The joint
name droit moral was first used in 1872 by Andre Morillot in a legal
journal 43 and was later defined by a U.S. author who stated that the
"rights evolved from a societal concern about individual author's and
artist's personality and reputation investments as they are exhibited
through their creative work. '44 The concept of droit moral did not
become part of French copyright law until 1957. 45 Currently, the laws
are set forth in Code de la Propridtj Intellectuelle of 1992, which is
recognized as the most comprehensive protection given to artists by
any nation. 46 The most important provision of this law states that the
47
author enjoys ownership rights to his name, authorship, and work.
These rights are strictly attached to the artist and are perpetual,
inalienable, and imprescriptible. 48 The first of these rights enables
the artist to make the independent decision as to the manner and
time of signing his creation, which allows him to chose to mark the
work with his name or pseudonym, or to publish the work
anonymously. Disclosing the author's name against his will gives the
artist the right to terminate the contract-e.g. with a publisher-and
to receive compensation for his loss. The second right protects the
artist from usurpation of authorship, which includes protection from
unlawful copying involving a clear usurpation of characteristic
attributes of the work of art. The third right involves respect for the
work itself, thus referring mostly to its integrity. French legislation
and courts grant maximum protection to both the nature and the

Marquam v. Lehuby, Tribunal de commerce [Trib. De Com.] Paris, Aug. 22,
41.
1845, S. Jur. II 1845, 459.
42.
Id.
A. Morillot, De la personnalitgdu droit de copie qui appartient& un auteur
43.
vivant, in REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION 1872; see RECHT, supra,note 23, at 110.
44.
Peeler, supra,note 31, at 426.
45.

J. CHATELAIN & F. CHATELAIN, OEUVRES D'ART ET OBJETS DE COLLECTION

EN DROIT FRANCAIS 199 (1990) (describing relevant provisions of Loi de 1957).
Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
46.
ComparativeLegal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 99 n.19 (1997).
47.
"L'auteur jouit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualit6 et de son
ceuvre." CODE DE LA PROPRIfTtI INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] art. L. 121-1
(2000) (Fr.).
"Ce droit est attach6 i sa personne. I1 est perp6tuel, inalienable et
48.
imprescriptible." Id.
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form of the artwork. 49 There are few exceptions to this strict rule in
well-justified circumstances. One far-reaching consequence of the
interpretation of the right to integrity is the possibility of violating
the right without making a direct change in the artwork. Pursuant to
a separate provision, the author has the right to divulge his work
while, at the same time, the author can determine the method of
disclosure and set the disclosure's conditions.5 0 Finally, the artist is
granted the right to withdraw the work from the market or to change
51
it as he sees fit.
Most of the rights discussed above may be inherited and
exercised after the author's death by persons listed in his will or by
his family members. Some rights may be exercised by the French
Minister of Culture. For this reason, one can argue that the concept of
droit moral includes three kinds of rights: (1) rights of the artists; (2)
rights of the persons appointed by the artist or by law, allowing those
appointed persons to protect the relationship between the artist and
his work; 52 and (3) public law, which serves the society by preventing
53
violations of works of art and misconceptions as to their authorship.
A discussion of French law could not be complete without
remarking on the right referred to as droit de suite.54 Because of its
economic dimension, it is not included in the category of moral rights.

See, e.g., id.
49,
"L'auteur a seul le droit de divulguer son ceuvre. Sous r6serve des
50.
dispositions de l'article L. 132-24, il dtermine le proc~dA de divulgation et fixe les
conditions de celle-ci." Id. art. L. 121-2.
"Nonobstant la cession de son droit d'exploatation, l'auteur, mme
51.
postrieurement A la publication de son oeuvre, jouit d'un droit de repentir ou de retrait
vis-A-vis du cessionnaire .... " Id. art. L. 121-4.
"L'exercise peut 6tre conf~r6 h un tiers en vertu de dispositions
52.
testamentaires." Id. art. L. 121-1; see e.g., art. L. 121-2.
A pros a mort, le droit de divulgation de ses oeuvres posthumes est exerc6 leur
vie durant par le ou les excuteurs testamentaires d~sign~s par l'auteur. A leur
dfaut, ou apr~s leur d~c~s, et sauf volont6 contraire de 'auteur, ce droit est
exerc6 dans l'ordre suivant: par les descendants, par le conjoint contre lequel
n'existe pas un jugement pass6 en force de chose jug~e de sparation de corps
ou qui n'a pas contract6 un nouveau mariage, par les h~ritiers autres que les
descendants qui recueilent tout ou partie de la succession et part les lgataires
universels ou donataires de l'universalit6 des biens Avenir.
53.

En cas d'abus notoire dans l'usage ou le non-usage du droit de divulgation
de la part reprsentants de l'auteur d~c~dA vis~s A l'article L. 121-2, le
tribulal de grande instatnce peut ordonner toute mesure appropri~e. I1 en
est de m~me s'il y a conflit entre lesdits reprsentants, s'il n'y a pas
d'ayant droit connu ou en cas de vacance ou de d~sh~nce. Le tribunal peut
6tre saisi notamment par le ministre charg6 de la culture.

Id. art. L. 121-3.
See, e.g., William Cornish, The Author As Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
54.
&ARTS 1 (2002).
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It is of significance to this discussion, however, because it remains
with the artist despite disposal of the work of art. Droit de suite gives
the artist the right to receive a share of profits each time a copy of the
artist's creation is sold. First introduced in France in 1920,55 and
56
subsequently incorporated into several different legal systems, it
finally become

part of a

European

Parliaments

and

Council's

57
Directive in 2001.
The concept of moral rights, subject to some modifications, was
widely accepted in many European countries. Polish doctrine, 58 for
example, identifies nine moral rights of artists in the copyright law of
1994. 59 According to Article 16 of the law, "personal rights shall
protect the bond between the creator and the work, which bond shall
not be limited in time or susceptible of renunciation or
assignment. . .,60 The second part of the provision explained that the
rights include the creator's right:

(1) to claim authorship of the work, (2) to cause the work to appear
under his name or pseudonym or to make his anonymous work
available to the public, (3) to insist on respect for the inviolability of the
content and form of the work, and on the proper use thereof, (4) to
decide to make the work available to the public for the first time, (5) to
61
oversee the manner of use of the work.

According to further provisions the author has also a right: (6) to
decide on the future of the original of a three-dimensional work
located in a place accessible to the public if the decision is taken to
destroy it,6 2 (7) to claim the acquirer of the original of the work to

55.
The current formulation of this right reads as follows: "Les auteurs
d'oeuvres graphiques et plastiques ont, nonobstant toute cession de l'oeuvre originale,
un droit inalienable de participation au produit de toute vente de cette oeuvre faite aux
ench~res publiques ou par l'interm6diaire d'un commerqant." C. PROP. INTELL. art. L.
122-8 (2000) (Fr.).
56.
See LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John M. Kernochan, ed., Louise MartinValiquette trans., Center for Law and the Arts, Columbia University School of Law
1991).
57.
Council Directive 2001/84/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 372/32) (E.N.); see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE PROPOSED GENERALISATION OF THE DROIT DE SUITE IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 16 n.1 (Intellectual Property Institute 1997).
58.

ELZBIETA WOJNICKA, OCHRONA AUTORSKICH D6BR OSOBISTYCH [Protection

of the Moral Rights of Authors] 83, 101-02 (1997).
59.
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Law of Feb. 4, 1994, art. 1-01 (1994)
(Pol.).
60.
Id. art. 16.
Id.
61.
62.
In particular, when such decision is taken, the owner must make an offer of
sale to the creator of the work or to his relatives, if it is possible to contact them. The
maximum price shall be based on the value of the material used to produce the work in
question. If sale is not possible, the owner shall allow artist either to make a copy or,
depending the nature of the work, to make appropriate documentation. Id. art. 32.2.
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make it available to him in the manner essential for the exercise of
copyright,6 3 (8) "to withdraw from the contract or to terminate it in
64
and (9) to make
consideration of his essential interests as a6 creator,"
5
changes in the work prior to its disclosure.
The United Kingdom was the first to codify a law based on
copyright principles when it passed the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act.6 6 It incorporated four moral rights: (1) the right to be
identified as author or director (the right of paternity or attribution);
(2) the right to object to derogatory treatment of a work (right of
integrity); (3) the right not to be falsely attributed as author or
and (4) the right to privacy of
director (false attribution of work);
67
certain photographs and films.
The United States was the second to pass a copyright law. The
law suggests setting forth all rights that the artist wants to protect in
the contract.68 This practice is followed in publishing, where contracts
forbid, for example, making changes in the published works without
the writer's consent. Some states have extended the rule to protect
the rights of artists.6 9 The most often cited example is the Art
Preservation Act adopted in California in 1979,70 which incorporated

In such case the acquirer may demand an appropriate guarantee and
63.
appropriate remuneration from the author for the use of the work. Id. art. 52.3.
Id. art. 56.1. According to Article 56.2, however, if in the course of the two
64.
years following the date of withdrawal or termination, the artist intends to proceed
with use of the work, he shall be obliged to propose such use to the acquirer or licensee,
allowing him an appropriate amount of time for the purpose. If the withdrawal or
termination occurs after acceptance of the work, its effectiveness may be subject, by the
other party, to a guarantee of repayment of the costs borne by the said party in relation
to the contract concluded. Repayment may not be claimed where the decision not to
disclose is due to circumstances beyond the control of the creator of the work according
to Art. 56.3. These provisions shall not be applicable to architectural and urban works,
to audiovisual works and to works commissioned for exploitation in audiovisual works.
Id. art. 56.4.
65.
Id. art. 60. According to Articles 60.1 and 60.2, the person who makes use
of the work shall be obliged to allow the creator to make an author's inspection prior to
the disclosure of the work. If the changes made to the work as a result of that
inspection are essential and attributable to circumstances beyond the creator's control,
the associated costs shall be borne by the acquirer of the economic rights or licensee.
Where the creator has not made his author's inspection within an appropriate time, he
shall be deemed to have consented to the disclosure of the work.
See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 (Eng.).
66.
67.
See Dworkin, supranote 36, at 19.
See SCOTT HODES, LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE ART AND COLLECTORS' WORLD 119
68.
(Irving J. Sloan ed., 1986); ROBERT PROJANSKY & SETH SIEGELAUB, THE ARTIST'S
RESERVED RIGHTS TRANSFER AND SALE AGREEMENT IN ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY,
PRACTICE 81 (Franklin Feldman & Stephen Weil eds., 1974).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.07
69.
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2005) (1963).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2005) (amended 1982). For the text and
70.
commentary, see NIMMER, supra note 69, § 8D.99.
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the right of paternity 71 and the right of integrity. 72 These rights refer,
however, only to select works: (1) original paintings, sculptures, or
original works of art in glass; (2) of recognized quality; (3) which were
73
not "prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser.
When the United States became a party to the Berne Convention, it
Act of 1990, which was similar in
adopted the Visual Artists Rights
74
scope.
in
narrower
but
principle,
In the international law arena, the moral rights formula was
incorporated to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works in 1928. 75 The 1971 Paris Act of the Convention's
respective clause reads as follows:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
76
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.

The Convention was based upon the "historical natural law
concept ... that the artist has a personal interest and the right in
preserving his reputation as well as in the proper display and
attribution of his work. '77 The Convention, however, represents only
a minimalist approach 78 to artists' moral rights, as it identifies only
the right to claim authorship and integrity of the work. In common
law, the first of these rights is usually interpreted literally: not as an
autonomous duty to reveal authorship-which is the norm in
continental Europe- 79but as a right that enables authorship to be

'The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for a
71.
just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 987(d).
"No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art
72.
which the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional
commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a
work of fine art." Id. § 987(c)(1).
Id. § 987(b)(2).
73.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
74.
(1990). For commentary see NIMMER, supra note 69, § 8D.63.
Actes de la Conference r~unie A Rome du 7 mai au 2 juin 1928, at 106
75.
(original document on file with author); see also SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at

98-104 (detailing the 1928 Rome Conference).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
76.
6bis, Jul. 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Mar. 1, 1989)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
Jody A. van den Heuvel, Moral Rights for Artists: The Development of a
77.
FederalPolicy, 19 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 8, 25 (Fall 1989).
Adolf Dietz, Legal Principles of Moral Rights (Civil Law), in THE MORAL
78.
RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR: CONGRESS OF ANTWERP 10 (1993) (source on file with author).
French law formulated a positive obligation to respect the name and the
79.
authorship of the artist. C. PROP. INTELL. art. L. 121-1 (2000) (Fr.).
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revealed only on demand. 80 The second interpretative difference
between the two systems is the right of integrity, concerning the
scope of intervention in the work. Some authors claim that all
activities listed are forbidden only if they are prejudicial to the
artist's honor or reputation. For others, the initial action, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work, are always forbidden;
other derogatory interventions are forbidden only if they are
prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. 8 '
Finally, a very general regulation regarding protection of droit
moral is set forth in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.8 2 According to Article 27.2, "[e]veryone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
83
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."
As Dietz noted, this instrument represents not only a high degree of
moral authority, but this formula was almost literally incorporated
into Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights which entered into force in 1976 as a binding
84
international treaty.
Recalling a philosophical justification for the protection of artists'
rights may summarize the discussion. A society benefits if its legal
system promotes artistic creativity. For the common and individual
good, the law must therefore create legal instruments that will
stimulate art desired by society. Artists' rights are therefore justified
by the good consequences of their legal recognition; this concept is
known as the consequentialist argument.8 5 Protection of these rights
can also have a deontological justification: protection may be based on
the labor theory under which the creator deserves the fruits of his
labor, or it may arise under the personality theory under which the

80.
For example, under English law this right does not arise until it has been
asserted. Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988, c. 4, § 78(1) (Eng.). As Bently and
Sherman explain, "[tihe imposition of the requirement of assertion is said to be
justified because Article 6 bis merely requires members of the Union to confer on
authors the right 'to claim' authorship," which also helps to overcome some of the
problems that may arise in tracing authors. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 238 (2001).
81.
HENRI DESBOIS ET AL., LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES

DU DROIT

D'AUTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS 41, 211 (1976); Jan Corbet, Le Droit Moral Dans les
Instruments Internationaux,in THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR, supra note 81, J

4-6.
82.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3), GA Res. 217A at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
83.
Id. art. 27(2).
84.
Adolf Dietz, The Artist's Right of Integrity Under Copyright Law: A
Comparative Approach, 25 IIC: INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 177, 178
(1994). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was
adopted by UN General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966.
85.
D. A. Nance, Foreword: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POLy 757, 763
(1990); see STERLING, supra note 24, at 55-62.
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artist has a moral right to protect his relationship with his creation
because the creation is an extension of his personality.8 6 Generally
speaking then, copyright is based on a promotional role of law while
droit d'auteur is based on an ethical and personal approach. We
cannot forget, however, that some deontological concepts gave rise to
the beginnings of moral rights protection within common law
87
copyright regulations.

IV. ARTIST'S RETAINED RIGHTS VS. OWNER'S RIGHTS: CAN THEY BE
RECONCILED?

Having described the origin and legal definition of an artist's
rights, this Article now attempts to determine what happens to those
rights after the artist disposes of the object in which the work is
embodied.8 8 Based on the above discussion, it is clear that obtaining
an object does not automatically transfer all the rights embodied
therein. The reverse is also true. Acquiring a copyright does not mean
that physical ownership of the object is acquired. Most systems of law
accept these principles and clarify them with appropriate regulations.
We find such examples in Polish,8 9 French, 90 German, 91 and
American law, each stating that, unless otherwise stipulated in the
contract, the artist retains his rights. 92 Such unequivocal statements,

86.
Nance, supra note 85, at 764.
87.
See, e.g., James M. Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral
Right", 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 487 (1968).
88.
See generally Jean Chatelain, The Original Work ofArt: A Lawyer's View, 1
INT'L J. MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 311 (1982) (regarding the originality and
protection of art).
89.

Unless otherwise provided, assignment of ownership rights in the copy of
a work shall not constitute assignment of the economic rights in the work
itself. 2. Unless otherwise provided, the transfer of the economic rights
shall not constitute assignment to the acquirer of the ownership rights in
the copy of the work.

Law of Feb. 4, 1994, Copyright and Neighboring Rights, art. 52.1-52.2 (1994) (Pol.).
90.
"La propridtd incorporelle ddfinie par l'article L. 111-1 (L'auteur d'une
oeuvre de l'esprit jouit sur cette ceuvre, du seul fait de sa crdation, d'un droit de la
propribtd incorporelle exclusif et opposable A tous) est ind6pendante de la propridtd de
l'objet matdriel." C. PROP. INTELL. art. L. 111-3 (Fr.).
91.
"If the author sells the original of a work, he shall not be deemed in case of
doubt to have thereby granted an exploitation right to the acquirer." Law on Copyright
and Neighboring Rights of 1965, amended by Intellectual Property Laws and Treaties,
Chp. 3, § 3, art. 44(1) (July 16, 1998) in World Intellectual Property Organization Rep.
(Apr. 1999). This statute is also available electronically at www.unesco.org/culture/
copy/copyright/polandlpagel.html.
92.

Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object.
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
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however, do not, clarify everything: how can the artist exercise his
rights if the object is not in his possession because it is owned by
someone else? It seems that we should accept, a priori, that it is not
possible to judge whether the rights of the artist or the owner are
paramount. Both droit d'auteur and copyright protect artists' rights,
albeit in a different scope. 93 On the other hand, no legal system treats
ownership as an absolute right. The owner has the freedom to
exercise his rights or transfer them but always does it "within the
limits of the law."
Therefore, in every legal system, neither the artist nor the owner
enjoy enough protection to prevent potential conflict. Most often we
have a situation where the owner's rights limit the artist and the
artist's rights simultaneously limit the owner. Because, subject to few
exceptions, neither of the rights will completely dominate the other,
the only solution is to find a sensible compromise that will, depending
on the situation, weigh the artist's and owner's interests and take
into account other particular circumstances in given situations.
94
Various legal systems balance these interests in different ways.

A. The Right of Paternity or Attribution
The right of paternity or attribution has two aspects. The
positive aspect, recognized by all legal systems, provides that the
artist has the right to claim authorship or remain anonymous even
after disposing of the original copy of the work.9 5 The negative aspect
acknowledges the artist's right to protect himself from so called false
attribution-the signing a work of art not created by him with his

copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including
the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in
the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or
of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any
material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2005).
93.

See ROBERT E. DUFFY, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS, AND

COLLECTORS 291 (1977); Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the
Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554 (1940) (regarding
moral rights at an earlier stage of their protection).
94.
See CLAUDE COLOMBET, GRANDS PRINCIPES DU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DES
DROITS VOISINS DANS LE MONDE: APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE 33 (1990) (providing a

general overview of an author's rights under various legal systems).
95.

BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 80, at 233; EUGENE ULMER, URHEBER- UND

VERLAGSRECHT 213-15 (1980); William R. Cornish, Moral Rights Under the 1988 Act,
11 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 449, 449 (1989).
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name. 96 In real life, these rights protect the author of the work when,
for example, the signature is removed from a work, even if the work
of art is completely inaccessible to the public. The principle was
directly confirmed in Millar v. Taylor in 1769, when the court first
formally dealt with the right to attribution. 97 The French case of
1836, Masson de Puitneuf v. Musard, stated that "the collaborator
whose name has been omitted without his knowledge from the title of
the work may obtain recognition of his authorship and his right
through the courts. 9 8s Further, in 1966, a French court voided a tenyear-old contract between a painter and art dealer where the painter
was required to sign some of the works with a pseudonym, and not
sign other works. 99 The judgment was commended for declaring that
the contract violated the artist's right to authorship by prohibiting
him from signing a number of works and by forcing him to use the
10 0
pseudonym.
An author can demand the removal of a false signature from a
work which is not his, or demand action to prevent his association
with a work he did not create, including, for example, changing an
incorrect attribution in a museum album or auction catalogue. 1 1
Such situations do not require additional explanation. Other
situations exist where the artist tries to deny authorship of his work
or attempts to remove his signature. 10 2 Whatever the artist's motives,
we must fully agree with a court's decision to dismiss the claims once
authenticity of the works is proven. If we grant the artist protection
from false attribution, then there is no reason to deny protection to
the owner of an authentic work of art who is trying to establish the
work's authenticity. Thus, we can positively judge the court's decision
in the case against the painter Vlaminck. Not only was Vlaminck's
claim dismissed, but he also was ordered to pay compensation to the
owner of the painting for injuring its marketability by groundlessly

96.

See, e.g.,

2

INTERNATIONAL

COPYRIGHT LAW AND

PRACTICE

Germany

§ 7[1][b] (Mellville B. Nimmer & Paul E. Geller eds., 1993) (discussing an author's
ability to exercise his right to recognition both positively and negatively).
97.
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769) (mentioning several authors'
interests affected by "piracy," including the right to have his name on the work when it
is published with his consent).
98.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Aug. 8, 1836, D. 1836,
241-43 (Fr.).
99.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 15, 1966, Gaz. Pal.
1967, 181 (Fr.).
100.
Id. at 478.
101.
See John H. Merryman, The Moral Right of Maurice Utrillo, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 445, 445 (1995) (discussing the problem of succession to the artist's right of
attribution).
102.
See Raymond Lindon, Droit moral de l'auteur, in DICTIONNAIRE JURIDIQUE
LES DROITs DE LA PERSONALITE 59 (1983) (discussing two such French cases).
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questioning its authorship.1 0 3 Such decisions are not only in the
owner's or artist's interest but also in the public's interest, since
falsely attributed works are prevented from reaching the market.
B. The Right of Access
If ownership of an object in which the artist's rights are
embodied is transferred, the artist may not be able to exercise his
rights because he cannot access the object. Specifically, it may not be
possible to take pictures or make copies of the art. Although giving
the artist the right to access the work is a serious interference with
the owner's rights, it seems nevertheless understandable and
justified to support such a right, especially if access is a condition to
the exercise of copyright (for example, if the work was never publicly
10 4
shown). French courts and legal doctrine uphold such a view.
French courts require a good reason before they will substantiate an
owner's refusal to allow the artist access to his work.' 0 5 German law
clearly defines this right, saying that: "The author may require the
owner of the original or of a copy of his work to afford him access to
original or the copy, provided it is necessary for making reproductions
or adaptations of the work and is not opposed by any legitimate
interest of the owner. ' 10 6 An example of enforcement of this provision
is the court decision concerning access to the death mask of Max
Liebermann that had never been publicly shown.10 7 Despite initial
doubts in the court of first instance, the court granted the author of
the mask the right to make a copy. This decision significantly
interfered in the owner's rights since the owner had to agree to allow
the object to be taken to a foundry for casting. Therefore, not only was

103.
Cour d'appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 19, 1961, R.I.D.A.
1962, 11, 218 (Fr.); see Marcel Rousselt & Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory of the
Moral Right of Authors and Artists under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 477
(1968).
104.
See, e.g., Law. No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, Journal Officiel de la
R16publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 11, 1957, art. 32, p. 2723,
reprinted in 1 UNESCO & WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAws & TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1984)
(codifying the artist's right is merely one component of the French doctrine).
105.
CLAUDE COLOMBET, PROPRIETE
VOISINS 132, 146, § 3 (Dalloz 1986) (1957).

LITTERAIRE

ET ARTISTIQUE

ET DROITS

Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of 1965, amended by Intellectual
106.
Property Laws and Treaties, ch. 3, § 3, art. 25, 1 (July 16, 1998) in World Intellectual
Property Organization Rep. (Apr. 1999). This statute is also available electronically at
www.unesco.org/culture/copy/copyright/poland/pagel.html.
UND
RECHTSSCHUTZ
GEWERBLICHER
Berlin, 83
Kamergericht
107.
URHEBERRECHT [G.R.U.R.] 742 (May 22, 1981); Kamergericht Berlin, 85 G.R.U.R. 507
(Feb. 8, 1983); Landesgerich Miinchen, 27 FILM UND RECHT 561 (Sept. 9, 1983); see
Adolf Dietz, Letter from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Development of
Copyright Between 1979 and the Beginning of 1984, 20 COPYRIGHT 426, 436-37 (1984)
(discussing current West German law).
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the owner temporarily deprived of the object, but he also ran the risk
that the object would be damaged. In light of these risks, general
consent to the right of access should be granted under the certain
conditions. First, an author should only be granted access to his work
to enable him to exercise the rights that he could not exercise without
access to the work. Second, the right of access should be exercised in
the manner least burdensome to the owner. Third, the author should
appropriately compensate the owner for the scope and manner of
access. Last, the author should cover all costs resulting from the
access, especially those related to potential damages. Article 52.3 of
the Polish copyright law is a good example of a well-balanced right to
access: "An acquirer of the original copy of the work is obliged to
make it accessible to its creator to the extent necessary for the
exercise of his author's rights. However, the acquirer may demand
that the creator provides proper security for the work and
remuneration for its use." 10 8
C. The Rights of Disclosure (Divulgation) and of Withdrawal (Retrait)
The right of disclosure allows the author to determine when his
work can be made available to the public, particularly when it will be
shown for the first time. This right is regularly granted to artists and
is based on the premise that the artist is the only person who can
decide when the work of art is finished, and when the object is made
public: the work "represents" its creator. Considering the subjective
character of such a decision, it is often difficult to determine the
moment when the artist has exercised his right with regard to a
particular work of art. Numerous judgments, especially in France,10 9
show the difficulty of the determination. The German court provided
an answer to this question in a slightly different context. 110 A certain
portrait was presented to the public at the exhibition and was later
shown on television, although not within the framework of legally
authorized reporting covered by Article 50 of the Copyright Act, as
Dietz explained."n The court agreed with the artist and declared that
his right of disclosure "covered not only the first dissemination but
that the author in any event preserved the right to decide whether
his work was to be disseminated by means or in a form that had not

108.
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of Feb. 4, 1994, art. 50 (1994)
(Pol.).
109.
See Frederic Pollaud-Dulian, Le Droit Moral en France a travers la
jurisprudencerdcente, 145 REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 127,
163 (1990).
110.
Landesgericht Berlin, 85 G.R.U.R. 761 (June 9, 1983).
111.
17 U.S.C. § 501 (explaining provisions governing causes of action for
infringment).
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yet taken place-which could also mean specific place." 112 This Article
will not go further in discussing this problem and merely indicates
that regardless of whether the author will regret his decision, the
voluntary sale of the work should always be interpreted as an act of
disclosure. It would therefore be difficult to sensibly argue that the
decision to transfer ownership of a work does not equal consent to the
first instance of public access. Such an interpretation would be
obvious if not for an unexpected precedent which occurred in the late
1920s. The painter Camoin brought suit when he found out that
paintings that he had cut and thrown away were subsequently found
and offered by Carco for sale. The court recognized Camoin's claim
and ordered the paintings to be destroyed "completely in the presence
of Camoin and Carco." 113 Because the right of disclosure overrode
ownership rights, it is worthwhile to quote the court's reasoning:
Whereas literary and artistic rights comprise a right which is in no way
pecuniary in nature but which, attached to the very person of the
author or of the artist, permits him during his lifetime to surrender his
work to the public only in such a manner and under such conditions as
he sees fit, the gesture of the painter who lacerates a painting and
throws away the pieces because he is dissatisfied with his composition
does not impair this right; and although whoever gathers up the pieces
becomes the indisputable owner of them through possession, this
ownership is limited to the physical quality of the fragments, and does
not deprive the painter of the moral right which he always retains over
his work. If the artist continues to believe that his painting should not
be put into circulation, he is within his rights to oppose any restoring of
1 14
the canvas and to demand, if necessary, that it be destroyed.

The person who found the destroyed paintings undoubtedly
became their owner since they were "abandoned property." 115 In
property law this means that the owner loses title, and thus the
painter should not have been able to demand their return. As
mentioned above, however, the court ordered that the paintings be
destroyed, indicating that, regardless of title or ownership, the artist
still had the right of disclosure of his creations. Camoin asserted this
right by destroying the paintings and disposing of the paintings. The

Dietz, supra note 107, at 436.
112.
Tribunaux de premiere instance [T.P.I.] [ordinary courts of original
113.
jurisdiction] Seine, Nov. 15, 1927, D.P. 1928, II, 89-93, note M. Nast (Fr.); Cour d'appel
[CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, Mar. 6, 1931, D.P. 1931, II, 88-89, note M. Nast
(Fr.). For an English translation of the judgement and the note see BARNETT
HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ART FOR LAWYERS COLLECTORS AND ARTISTS

314 (1959). See also Colombet, supra note 105, at 152 (discussing these cases);
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 46, at 136-37.
114.
See Rousselt & Sarraute, supra note 103, at 469 (discussing the relevance
of this quotation).
According to Roman law tradition, under res derelicta, the works were
115.
indeed abandoned since the painter voluntarily got rid of them.
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only way to respect his decision and his copyright was to prevent sale
of the paintings and order their destruction. It was not, as doctrine
emphasized, a vindication claim referring to the return of the works,
but a decision based on droit d'auteur.In other words, the moral right
prevailed over the ownership right to the extent that it could be used
against the physical owner of the work. 116 Commentators were
immediately critical of the decision and argued that the deletion of
the artist's signature from the restored work and the prohibition of
the public exhibition or sale of the work under the artist's name was
117
the only sanction the artist should have been allowed in the case.
An extension of the right of disclosure is the right to withdraw.
The right is far-reaching for the artist since it allows him to
temporarily withdraw the art to correct it or withdraw the art
permanently, if it no longer represents the artist's opinions or if the
art was not well-received by the audience. In principle, French and
German laws, as well as laws in some other countries, grant the
author the withdrawal rights if the author is prepared to pay
compensation, 118 although it seems that such a right has a greater
effect in the publishing industry than in the visual arts. 119 In any
case, it would be difficult to argue that withdrawal should be
exercised against the owner's will. Accordingly, the artist cannot
effectively demand that the owner release the work after it is sold to
make changes or to request the return of the work altogether, even if
the artist is willing to reimburse the owner. Doctrine holds that this
would be no different than expropriation and there would be no
grounds for demanding such a return. 120 The uniform approach did
not, however, prevent attempts by some artists to have their works
returned. One artist, the painter Vlaminck, mentioned above, was
unable to claim withdrawal and demanded a return of the paintings
on the grounds that he was not the author of the works and the
signatures were falsified. Both claims were rightfully dismissed. The
court stated that even if the artist wanted to correct a work that he

116.
MICHAf9LIDtS-NOUAROS, supra note 19, at 198 ("Le droit de l'auteur de
rester maitre de son oeuvre et d'en disposer souverainment existe 6galement contre des
tiers ayant obtenu par suite d'un mode originaire la propri6t6 de ses oeuvre.").
117.
See Rousselt & Sarraute, supra note 103, at 470 (discussing the decision
previously identified in Nast's note).
118.

See C. PROP. INTELL. art. L. 121-4 (2000) (Fr.); German Law. Comp. art. 41;

see also J.L. Bismuth, Droits des crdateurs et de leurss hdritiers, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
SALES OF WORKS OF ART 210, 210-11 (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1991)
(discussing other legislation).
119.
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 46, at 139 (noting that the opinion is
based on the quoted decision denying the right of withdrawal to painter Vlaminick); see
Pollaud-Dulian, supranote 109, at 180-82 (discussing this problem further).
120.
Quentin Byrne-Sutton, The Owner of a Work of Visual Art and the Artist:
Potential Conflicts of Interest, in INTERESTS IN GOODS 281, 290 (Norman Palmer &

Ewan McKendrick eds., 1993).

1162

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:1141

deemed unsuccessful, he could not claim the work's return. The
ability to make corrections ends at the moment ownership is
12
transferred and the signed work of art is released. '
Finally, a clear consequence of such a view is that the artist
cannot demand that the work be destroyed, even if it is damaging to
his reputation.
D. The Right to Exhibit
The right to disclose must be differentiated from the problem of
public display. Two issues come into play in this context: (1) whether
the artist can demand that an artwork's owner release the artwork to
show it at an exhibition, or (2) whether the artist can demand that
artwork remain on permanent exhibition in a public place.
The artist cannot demand that an owner release his work so that
it may be shown in an exhibition. Though it is understandable that
an artist would want his work to be exhibited as often as possible, it
would not be acceptable to expect the owner to release the artwork
whenever the artist demanded. The interference would be too farreaching into ownership rights and, at least with the most popular
works, it could virtually prevent the owner from exercising his rights.
Furthermore, this demand cannot be interpreted as exercising the
right to access since the goal is very different. Thus, unless otherwise
stipulated in the contract of sale, releasing the work to the artist for
an exhibition would have to stem from a special provision in the law.
In general, laws do not include such provisions, but exceptions exist,
such as the 1988 revision of the Canadian Copyright Act. According to
the Act, the artist has a right to present at a public exhibition any of
the artist's works owned by another person, as long as it is for a
122
purpose other than sale or hire.
The solution to the second issue about art objects on permanent
exhibit is similar, but not as absolute. If the work is to be removed,
doubts arise as to whether the work is an inseparable part of the
spatial composition. This case also creates an infringement on the
right of integrity, which will be discussed below. In circumstances
where there is no infringement on the right of integrity, it will be
more difficult for the artist to demand that his artwork remain
exhibited in a public place against the will of those who can decide on
the change of the work's location. There are, however, possible
exceptions. One example is the 1954 decision in Christos Kapralos v.

121.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris (Trib. Gr. Inst. De Paris),
le ch., Apr. 19, 1961, Gaz. Pal. 1961, 2, 218; 34 R.I.D.A. 119 (1962) (Fr.).
Copyright Act, 142 R.I.D.A. 407 (1989), amended by 35-36-37 Elizabeth II,
121.
ch. 15 (Can.); Byrne-Sutton, supra note 120, at 295.
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Rhodes City Council.123 The council removed Kapralos's sculpture
from a square and decided to locate it elsewhere. The court ruled that
124
the council's decision infringed on the moral rights of the artist.
There have also been other court decisions favorable to artists. In
these cases, however, other elements played a role: for instance, in
one case, a fountain created by artist Scrive was specifically
commissioned to decorate a supermarket. 125 In another case, the
contract with the artist Jean-Philippe Dubuffet was terminated and
the sculpture returned to the artist before it was completed. 126 The
latter judgment was particularly important to Colombet, who said
that it implicitly declared that le droit moral de l'auteur prevailed
12 7
over the right of property.
Discussion of the right to exhibit must include a negative
approach to this right: can the owner be prevented by the artist from
exhibiting his work? Generally it would be difficult to obtain such a
ban pursuant to a court decision, because public exhibition of an
acquired work of art represents legitimate use of property. Most legal
systems accept that the owner is free to do as he wishes in this
respect; an exception to this principle may only be provided by a
specific provision of law. Again, pursuant to the Canadian Copyright
Act, the artist has some control over public exhibition of his work
after it is sold. Interestingly, the right pertains also to the work's
successive owners. 128 Polish copyright law provides yet another

123.
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court] Nov. 9, 1954, Session
Pleniere, 55 E.E.N. 1954, 78.
124.
J.L. Bismuth, supra note 118, at 266.
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
125.
Paris, May 14, 1974, 84 R.I.D.A. 219 (1975); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, 25e ch., July 10, 1975, 91 R.I.D.A. 114 (1977); COLOMBET, supra note
105, at 142-43.
126.
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, March 23, 1977, 93 R.I.D.A. 191 (1977), note Desbois; Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., June 2, 1978, D. 1979, 14, note Colombet; 98
R.I.D.A. 85 (1978); Cour de Cassation, Jan. 8, 1980, 83, note Edelman. For futher
comments see Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, July 8, 1981, 111
R.I.D.A. 201 (1981); Cour d' Cassation, Mar. 16, 1983, 117 R.I.D.A. 80 (1983);
CAVersailles, Mar. 16, 1983, EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL CASES 1983, 453; CHATELAIN &
CHATELAIN, supra note 45, at 201; COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 143-44; Dietz, supra

note 107, at 189-90.
127.

COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 144.

Cet arr6t pr~sente une grande importance puisque, tr~s justement selon nous,
il fait implicitement pr6valoir le droit moral de l'auteur sur le droit de
propri~t6. Sur renvoi, la Cour de Versailles, affirmant l'obligation, pour le
contractant de l'artiste, d'assurer la construction de lceuvre command~e, a bien
soulign6 que seule la force majeure pouvait justifier l'inex6cution, et la Cour de
cassation a rejet6 le pourvoi, donnant ainsi definitivement raison l'auteur.
128.

Bismuth, supra note 118, at 96; Byrne-Sutton, supra note 120, at 296.
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example. According to Article 32.1, if there is nothing to the contrary
in the sales contract, the owner of an original three-dimensional work
may show it in public on the condition that no profit-making purpose
is pursued thereby. Finally, one general exception, set forth in the
Berne Convention, gives the artist control over showing his works on
television. A broadcast is deemed as a separate form of exploitation,
129
which goes beyond normal use of the artwork by the owner.
Lastly, there have been demands to expand the right to exhibit.
Such far-reaching proposals are put forth by some authors pursuant
to so called droit de destination.l3 0 This approach proposes that the
author be granted the exclusive right to define and control the use of
the work by its successive owners, 13 1 especially with regard to public
showings. One proposal suggests that the author be given the right to
decide this matter, giving him the right to demand or prohibit the
showing of the work at a given exhibition. If these proposals were
accepted, the right of the owner would be significantly limited.
E. The Right of Integrity
As can easily be seen, the artist's right to demand that his work
remain unchanged and whole-that is, not mutilated or modified
without consent-is very controversial and the most difficult of the
artist's rights to execute. Thus, legal regulations show a marked
diversity of approaches, from wide acceptance for protection of
integrity to excluding it completely with regard to certain works.
Court decisions are similarly diverse. Lest it drown in an analysis of
the details, this Article will address the basic question: what is the
goal of the right of integrity? Is it the maintenance of integrity of the
artistic message contained in the work, aimed at preserving the
artist's reputation? Is it the protection of works from mutilation more
generally, which would go beyond protecting only the artist's
interests? Though the question seems hypothetical, it contains a
practical dimension. We have to make a choice between two
approaches to this right: first, a restricted approach which protects
only from interferences which the artist believes changes his artistic
intent and is thus derogatory to him as an artist and therefore
forbidden by law; or second, an expansive approach which aims to

129.
See Berne Convention, art. llbis ("(1) Authors of literary and artistic works
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: (i) the broadcasting of their works or the
communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs,
sounds or images ... ").
130.
Andre Francon & Henri Desbois, L'avernir du droit d'auteur, 132 R.I.D.A. 3
(1987).
131.
Francon & Desbois, supra note 130, at 10.
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prevent any interference, protects the artist's rights, and benefits
society.
The first approach is embraced by the countries that favor a
narrow interpretation of Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention under
which an author may object only to such action in relation to his work
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. A similar
definition of the right of integrity is included in the laws of several
countries, though they offer different levels of protection. An example
of minimum protection is English law, which preserves mostly only
the basic integrity of a work.1 3 2 The key to understanding the level of
protection is the right interpretation of the term "derogatory
treatment of the work."'133 This is proved when (1) the work has been
or will be subject to addition, deletion, alteration, or adaptation; and
(2) such damages "amount[ ] to distortion or mutilation of the work or
[are] otherwise prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the author or
director." 13 4 The formula covers, for example, unauthorized
colorization of a black and white film, but does not include the
physical relocation of artistic work to a place other than originally
agreed upon by the artist. Nor does British law proscribe the
even though it
placement of the work in an inappropriate context,
135
artist.
the
to
objectionable
and
damaging
may be
German law provides the artist with much wider scope of
protection. The artist may prohibit any distortion or mutilation of his
work which would jeopardize his legitimate intellectual or personal
interest in the work.' 3 6 This right, however, has no discretionary
character and in every individual case must be properly justified by
the author. If proven that a distortion of the work damages the
artist's reputation or any of the artist's other interests protected by
law, copyright theory balances the interests to resolve the conflict

According to some opinions, Britain regards artist's moral rights "as a
132.
brake on the exploitation of copyright" and consequently incorporated them into
copyright law as minimally as possible so that their U.K. edition is, as McCartney said,
"well below the Berne Convention standard." Irini A. Stamatoudi, Moral Rights of
Authors in England: The Missing Emphasis on the Role of Creators,4 INTELL. PROP. Q.
478, 506 (1997).
133.
SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 74 (2001).

134.
Cornish, supra note 95, at 450. For a discussion of the term "artistic" in the
area of copyright law, see David L. Botton, Legal Determinations of Artistic Merit
Under United Kingdom Copyright Law, 1 ART ANTIQUITY AND L. 125 (1996).
135.
See Dworkin, supra note 36, at 22 (explaining the right of integrity may not
provide protection when, for example, a "respectable" work is placed in an exhibition of
pornographic material or used for advertising).
Gesetz uber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
136.
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1 I at 1273, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/
gla/statutesUrhG.htm#14 (last accessed on Nov. 1, 2005) (Article 14 of the German
Copyright Act).
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between the owner and the artist. 13 7 French and Polish laws provide
examples of the widest possible interpretation of the right of
integrity. As stated above, the obligation to respect the artist's work
stipulated in the French code should be treated literally-the owner
has a general obligation to respect the shape and form of the workand courts permit only minor or necessary modifications. The most
often quoted example is a case in which painter Bernard Buffet
decorated a refrigerator to sell it at a charity auction. Some time after
the sale, the artist discovered that the separated front panel was
offered for sale and brought a suit against the owner to prevent the
sale. The court prevented the sale of the separate decorated panels of
the refrigerator, ruling that they formed an integral work of art and
that taking them apart would be an infringement of the moral rights
of the artist. 138 It was argued by the court
that the moral right which is vested in the author of an artistic work
entitles that author to ensure that after the work has been disclosed to
the public it is not distorted or mutilated when, as in this particular
case, the Court of Appeal has held with sovereign jurisdiction that the
work of art at issue, purchased as such, formed a single unit in the
subjects chosen and manner in which they had been handled and that,
by cutting up the refrigerator's panels, the purchaser mutilated it. 1 3 9

This ruling is often cited as an example of the supremacy of the
moral rights of artists over owners' rights to freely use the work. As
Merryman noted, "the right of integrity arguably reduces to some
extent the owner's legal power over the work of art by forbidding him
to modify it."'140 Polish judicial decisions ban making modifications in
the works and do not limit the bans to cover acts that are prejudicial

137.
See Dietz, supra note 107, at 183 (discussing, but not necessarily endorsing,
a balancing of interests).
138.
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Siene, June 7, 1960 (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 30,
1962, at 570-71; note H. Desbois, J.C.P., 1963, II, 12989; note R. Savatier, Cour de
Cassation, July 6, 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965, no 2, at 126; CHATELAIN & CHATELAIN, supra
note 45, at 202-03; COLOMBET, supra note 94, at 142-43; H. DESBOIS: LE DROIT
D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE, 498-500 (1966); STROWEL, supra note 21, at 500.
139.
COLOMBET, supra note 94, at 142-43 (quoting Pollaud-Dulian, supra note
109, at 210). Colombet quotes this judgement in the original version as follows:
le droit moral qui appartient A 'auteur d'une oeuvre artistique donne A celui-ci
la facult6 de veiller, apr6s sa divulgation au public, 6 ce que son oeuvre ne soit
pas d~natur6e ou mutil6e lorsque, comme en l'esp~ce, la cour d'appel relive
souvrainement que l'oeuvre d'art litigieuse, acquise en tant que telle,
constitutant une unit6 dans les sujets choisis et dans la mani~re dont ils
avaient 6t0 trait~s et que, par le d~coupage des panneaux du r~frigrateur
l'acqu6reur l'avait mutil6e.
COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 173.

140.
John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1023, 1047 (1976).
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to artist's honor or reputation. Therefore, it is understood that the
ban is extensive and a potential claim should be based on the
argument that the change in the work not only violates the formal
right of integrity but also the "bond existing between the creator and
'141
his work."
The Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) is an example of a
law that affords authors a narrowly formulated right to integrity.
Special Section 106A added to the U.S. Copyright Act allowed authors
of visual art to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to the artist's
honor or reputation. 142 There are several exceptions to this right:
when artwork incorporated into building, when modification is a
result of passage of time, or when modification is a result of the
inherent nature of the material. One should also remember at this
point that the relevant definition of visual art covers only certain
artwork. For example, under VARA, the author's right of integrity to
original paintings, drawings, or sculptures, 143 endures only for a term
of the life of author. 144 This is not the case under European laws.
In comparison to VARA and civil law systems, the California
Civil Code goes beyond the traditional right of integrity and provides
a more general protection formula justified by public interest.
Irrespective of the rationale behind the protection of integrity of fine
145
art against actions which are detrimental to an artist's reputation,
the state legislature declared that public interest mandated
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.
Accordingly, the California state legislature granted certain
organizations the right to commence action against "any defacement,
mutilation, alteration, or destruction" of a work of fine art of
recognized quality and of substantial public interest. 146 The motives
for enacting this law were explained by its initiator who said, that
"works of fine art are more than economic commodities and they
oftentimes provide our communities with a sense of cohesion and
history. The public's interest in preserving important artistic

141.

JANUSZ BARTA ET AL.,

PRAWO

AUTORSKIE I PRAWA POKREWNE [COMMENTARY

ON THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS] 238 (2005).

142.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
17 U.S.C. § 101; NIMMER, supra note 69, § 8D.06[A].
143.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
144.
145.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West 2005) ("The Legislature hereby finds and
declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of
the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore
have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against any alteration or
destruction...").
Id. § 987(c)(1); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 989(c) (authorizing an organization
146.
acting in the public interest to commence an action for injunctive relief to preserve or
restore the integrity of a work of art from the acts described in § 987(c)(1)).
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creations should be promoted and our communities should be able to
preserve their heritage when it is in jeopardy."'147 This law fills a void
existing in the protection of art until the art is embraced by cultural
148
heritage law.
There were also other proposals made under U.S. law to protect
and preserve important works of art. For example, it was suggested
that courts could adopt the common law doctrine of public dedication
of art 14 9 that would allow government representatives and private
individuals to bring suit to protect the visual integrity of culturally
valuable works of art from both intentional and negligent injury. This
doctrine was found to properly "balance the public welfare, not merely
the rights of an individual artist, against the rights of an individual
owner of art."'150
The right of integrity, next to the right of paternity, it is the most
important of the discussed rights. Regardless of its function for the
artist, its exercise serves an important public interest. Works of art
are, on one hand, always individual achievements of the artists, but
on the other hand form a part of our common heritage. No one doubts
that it is in society's interest to protect this heritage as a value
attesting to society's current quality of life. Less often we remember
the equally important duty to keep works of art for future
generations. 151 To properly and honestly accomplish these goals the
works of art have to reflect the intentions of their creators. They have
to be true and authentic, as they were when they left the hand of the
artist or artisan. Otherwise, works of art do not truly reflect their
time period (whether distortions of artwork also reflect the time
period is another issue altogether). 152 It must be emphasized that
such a view of the public interest is in no way against artists'
interests and, on the contrary, strengthens their protection. In
reality, these interests intertwine at the moment the artwork is

147.
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 24 (1999) (quoting a Letter from Senator Alan Sieroty
to Honorable Edmund G. Brown Jr. dated Sept. 3, 1982, and on file with California

State Archives); see also Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists' Rights and
HistoricPreservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 433 (1994) (noting that such
an approach "may be viewed, at least in part, as a vehicle for accomplishing the goal of
historic preservation").
148.
For more on this subject see Swack, supra note 19.
149.
This doctrine could be based on the theory of public dedication of land,
which is seen as a well-established method of asserting public rights in private
property. See Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 126 (1981).
150.
Id.
151.
See 2 E. BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 128-32,

270-76 (1989).
152.
John Henry Merryman, The PublicInterest in CulturalProperty, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 339, 346 (1989).
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created, creating the temptation to accept a wider interpretation of
the right of integrity than is stipulated in the Berne Convention. In
particular, claims against any and all distortions-not just those
prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation-could be possible.
Though in principle this Author agrees with this approach, one
precaution should be taken into account: copyright law should not
strive to replace or even compete with cultural heritage law.
Acceptance of a wide interpretation of the right of integrity should go
only as far as it protects the interest of the artist and the public
interest, but protection of the public interest in itself should remain
within cultural heritage law. If this law focuses only on the protection
of properly old objects, it could be supplemented with rights being
15 3
granted to organizations under California law, as discussed above.
The laws could be responsible for the protection of valuable works of
art in the interim period-before the work of art is considered
cultural heritage but when its protection is in the public interest. The
scope of activity should, however, be classified as protection of
cultural heritage rather than enforcing the artist's right of integrity,
even though in practical terms the activity helps artists and exercises
some scope of their right.
The above cannot lead to an extremist approach-that all artistic
creations should be preserved wholly and completely. One must
remember that the point is not to find one absolute solution, but to
154
balance the rights of the artist and the owner of his work.
Problems do not usually arise with respect to typical artworks and, in
those cases, we tend to accept a wider breadth of artist's rights.
Problems arise with respect to applied art, especially architecture.
Architecture is undoubtedly artistic creation and, subject to few
exceptions, is treated the same as other fields of art. Architecture's
function, however, often justifies necessary limitations to the right of
integrity. French courts, although paying particular attention to
artists' rights, supply numerous decisions proving the above point.
One example is a court ruling concerning the adaptation of a space
inside a building by its owner-space which according to the architect
was to remain empty. 155 When the architect found out about the

153.
The National Endowment for the Arts is an example of such an
organization, and according to one commentator, "[it] should further protect the public
interest in art by promulgating regulations that allow that agency to sue to protect
publicly supported artwork from injury." Note, supra note 149, at 127.
154.
For a discussion on the problems connected with balancing these interests,
see Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 109, at 212; Dietz, supra note 107, at 182-86.
155.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 15, 1990, 147
R.I.D.A. 1991, 311; Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, March 29, 1989, D. 1990, Somm. 54, note C. Colombet; Premiere
chamber civile [Cass. le civ.], Jan. 7, 1992, D. 1993, Somm. 88, obs. C. Colombet;
COLOMBET, supra note 94, at 144-45.
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changes, he claimed that the building had been mutilated and that
the integrity of his work was violated. 156 The Paris court ruled that
the adaptation was justified by the economic need and, moreover, the
changes were made in a way which were not very visible and did not
significantly harm the design. 15 7 Another argument was used in the
Thdtre des Champs-Elysges Case in 1990,158 when the court held
that
even if the emotion felt by both the plaintiffs and the intervening
parties is understandable .... the alterations made to the work do not
constitute a substantial distortion of the creation by the Perret brothers
and Antoine Bourdelle, but are in keeping with a necessary evolution of
159
architectural works in time and space.

These decisions should not, however, suggest that courts always
rule in favor of owners making changes to buildings that are
unauthorized by the architect. For example, when the interior of the
Lille town council auditorium was changed from the architect's
original plans, the court found "that the work on the inner shell of the
building, which had been carried out without the architect's
agreement, had disfigured his work by destroying the harmony of the
original ensemble he had designed and that none of Lille town
council's alleged technical imperatives could be substantiated... ",160
Consequently, the architect was declared "justified in invoking the
'16 1
right to respect his work against the owner of the structure.
Another example is a Swiss copyright infringement case brought
when the shape of a roof was changed. The court ruled that the
changes were not justified by economic need and stated that claimant
proposed only a slightly more expensive design, which would have
16 2
met the owner's needs and preserved the architectural design.
These and other court decisions demonstrate that since
architecture is an applied art, it may be modified for economic need if
there is no other alternative which would be less damaging to the
architectural design of the building. This approach-aiming to
balance the interests of the owner and the architect-seems best.
Pursuant to such a view it is not necessary to exclude architectural
works from protection. Accordingly, provisions of the Architectural

156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Cour d'appel [CAI[regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., July 11, 1990, 146
R.I.D.A. 1990, 299; Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, Apr. 4, 1990, 145 R.I.D.A. 1990, 386.
159.
Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 109, at 214.
160.
Premiere chamber civile [Cass. le civ.], Dec. 1, 1987, 136 R.I.D.A. 1988,
137.
161.
Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 109, at 214.
162.
Urteil des Kantonsgerichts St. Gallen, in 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR URHEBER-UND
MEDIENRECHT 297 (1990).

20051

A COMPARA TIVE LA WANAL YSIS OFAR TITS' RIGHTS

1171

Works Copyright Protection Act 16 3 that reduce the protection only to
structures that are both "original" and "not wholly functional" seem
to go too far. 164
Analysis of the right of integrity would not be complete without
discussing the owner's right to destroy a work of art and, possibly, the
artist's right to prevent its destruction. It is often argued that this is
a form of infringement on the right of integrity. There is another,
possibly more prevalent, interpretation: complete destruction of the
work is not as detrimental to the artist's honor or reputation as
modifying an artist's work and artistic message. A similar argument
was raised by a German court: complete destruction does not affect
the integrity of the work when the work ceases to exist, preventing
the honor and reputation (moral rights) of the creator from being
prejudiced.' 6 5 In another case, a German court ordered the partial
removal of a building complex decoration by Otto Hajek, but also
allowed the final removal of remaining parts of the decoration by the
owner of the building. 166 This opinion was later confirmed by a second
decision in the same case, where the court maintained that the owner
was entitled to destroy the decoration completely, adding that the
owner could do so for any reason whatsoever, including simply "that
he had had enough of it."167
In France, the law in this area is unclear. For example, a French
court held that the destruction of the frescoes in the chapel in Juvisy
and the sculpture in the park in Grenoble was justified as being
within the property rights of the owner, 168 or as being dictated by the
necessity of public safety. 169 There are other cases, however, where
courts were more generous to artists. For example, the destruction of
the fountain commissioned for a commercial center by the artist
Scrive was found to infringe the artist's rights because this act could

163.
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 17 U.S.C. (1990)).
164.
See 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) ("[T]he owners of a building embodying an
architectural work may, without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the
architectural work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such building.").
165.
Reichsgericht [RG][Federal Court of Justice] June 8, 1912, 147
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 397.
166.
Landesgericht Munchen [LG] [national court] Dec. 8, 1981, Film und Recht
510, 1982 (F.R.G.).
167.
Landesgericht Muinchen [LG] [national court] Aug. 3, 1982, Film und Recht
513, 1982 (F.R.G.); Dietz, supra note 107, at 438.
168.
See Tribunaux Civ. Versailles, June 23, 1932, D.H. 1932, 487 (Fr.); Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, D.H. 1934, 785 (Fr.);
COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 141

169.
See Tribunaux administratifs [TA] [regional administrative courts of first
instance] Grenoble, Feb. 18, 1976, 91 R.I.D.A. 1977, 166, note A. Francon (Fr.);
COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 143.
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170
not be "exonerated by something unforeseeable and irresistible."'
Similarly, the demolition of church sculpture by protestors, the
disassembling and dispersing of work of art commissioned for a
chapel, 171 and the destruction of the roof sculpture by new owners of
the house 172 were all declared to be infringements of the artist's
rights.
A variety of these judgments leads to the more general
conclusion that the issue remains controversial. Therefore, neither
the law nor the courts have formulated a general ban on these
actions. "Nothing is said [in law] expressly about destruction" stated
Crewdson, while commenting that the destruction of Graham
Sutherland's portrait of Sir Winston Churchill was "one of the most
outrageous pieces of vandalism of this century."'173 The only exception
seems to be already partly presented in VARA. The Act provides that
the author of visual art has a right "to prevent any destruction of a
work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent
1 74
destruction of that work is a violation of that right."'
The protection of the artist's rights, however, may in no way
expand to allow the work to be destroyed simply because of the
artist's volition. This interference in ownership rights would be too
far-reaching and difficult to justify.
The final issue, in discussing the right of integrity, is the exercise
of the right upon death of the artist. Following the principle in the
Berne Convention, national laws resolve this problem differently:
either the right expires upon death or it may be exercised by heirs or
other institutions, even upon expiration of economic rights. 1 75
Pursuant to the legal nature of moral rights and their strict

170.
Tribunaux de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary courts of original
jurisdiction] Paris, May 14, 1974, 84 R.I.D.A. 1975, 219 (Fr.); see Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 25e ch., July 10, 1975, 91 R.I.D.A. 1977, 114 (Fr.);
COLOMBET, supra note 105, at 142-43.

See Cour d' appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, l6re ch., Apr. 10,
171.
1995, 166 R.I.D.A. 1995, 316 (Fr.).
172.
See Cour d' appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris 163 R.I.D.A. 148-51
(1995); Cour d'Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1994, 163 R.I.D.A. 1995, pp.
149-50, note K6r~ver.
173.
Richard Crewdson, Relations between Artists and their Heirs and Dealers,
Galleries and Patrons,in INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAW 341, 343-44 (Martine

Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1991) (This opinion was expressed at the Amsterdam
Conference of 1990, before the Visual Artist Rights Act was issued).
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2005); compare Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89
174.
N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949) (holding that, in the absence of a contract to the
contrary, an artist has no right to prevent the destruction of his artwork by its owner)
with NIMMER, supra note 69, § 8D.06 [C] [1] (noting that "recognized stature" need not
rise to the level of a Picasso, Chagall, or Giacometti).
175.
See C. PROP. INTELL. art. L. 121-1 (Fr.) (stating that the right to respect for
work is perpetual and imprescriptible, may be transmitted mortis causa to the heirs of
the author, and may be conferred on another person under the provisions of a will).
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connection to the person whom they protect, we should assume that
these rights expire upon the author's death. Without a doubt,
however, both the interest of the heirs as well as public interest
speaks for preserving the integrity of works regardless of the fate of
their creators. It may be possible in such circumstances to have two
parties exercising the right of integrity-the heirs and bodies which
protect the integrity of the works pro publico bono. Initially, these
entities should complement each other and in the future the public
interest element should take over the protection of integrity of the
work.
F. Droit de Suite and Exercise of Copyright
The so called droit de suite, or artist's resale right, is the artist's
right to an interest in any sale of his work. It is an economic right
fashioned after moral rights; droit de suite is an inalienable right,
pertains to artworks which the artist does not own, and extends to
the artist's heirs. 176 As noted earlier, the concept was adopted in
France over eighty years ago and later adopted by several European
legal systems and by the Californian legislature. It became part of
E.U. law in a 2001 Directive. The adoption of droit de suite has raised
widespread criticism. Many arguments have been made against the
right-for example the claim that in today's world the value of a work
of art cannot only be credited to its creators. 177 Artists' orientated
forces are more influential, however, and the arguments have no
effect on the development of the right. A European lawyer can only
note the expansion of droit de suite despite the fact that its statutory
form is sometimes contrary to its essence. For example, Polish
regulations currently in force entitle the artist to participate in the
price for which the copy of his work was sold regardless of whether it
1 78
was higher or lower then the price he was paid for his work.

176.

See

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

LAW

163-82

(Anthony

D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (discussing the concept of a driot de suite in a
wider context).
177.
For a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of droit de suite, see
John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103,
(1993); Merryman, supranote 57, at 21.
178.
See Law of Feb. 4, 1994, Copyright and Neighboring Rights. art. 19-1
(1994) (Pol.).
The creator and his successors shall be entitled to remuneration amounting to
5 [percent] of the proceeds of the sale by auction of the original of a threedimensional work or of the manuscript of a literary or musical work. The
vendor shall be obliged to pay the said remuneration and, if he is acting on
behalf of a third party, shall be jointly liable with that party.
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Furthermore, upon the sale of a copy of his work, the artist is
still entitled to basic copyright protection independent of droit de
suite. The reason for this, as specified above, is that protection is not
connected to ownership of the copy and is not automatically
transferred to the buyer as a result of sale. This issue is quite clear in
light of regulations quoted above, but exercise of copyright may create
difficulties for the owner in using the work and thus limits his
ownership rights. Such a situation takes place if the work has only
one copy and the artist needs to get access to the work.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Artistic output and its embodiment, though viewed as legally
equivalent, are in fact subject to two sets of legal regulations, owed
simultaneously and independently to two persons. The first person is
the author of the work, and the second is the buyer of the object in
which the work is embodied. Such a situation is understood, accepted,
and appreciated, but can also lead to problems and legal conflicts. A
conflict of interest is most often witnessed with the exercise of the
artists' rights. Regardless of the regulatory details of the rights of
access, disclosure, withdrawal, exhibit, or integrity, the execution of
the rights will always infringe on the use of the material art object or,
in other words, will interfere with the right of ownership. While the
artist's rights are universally justified and take into account
paternity-the unbreakable bond between the artist and his workas well as the present trend aiming to widely interpret artists' rights,
any limitation in their scope is not considered. Quite the opposite is
by
true: the interpretation may only become wider, for example 179
introducing so called right of destination (droit de destination),
which would give artists control over how their art is used, even by
successive owners. This would constitute an even more significant
encroachment on ownership rights. There are other limitations to
ownership. Most often they are connected with the increase of public
interest in cultural issues, which is well characterized by Professor
Sax:
[W]hile one can own things, no one can own ideas or knowledge. They belong in
the public domain because they are basic building blocks of our common
the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, and the
agenda:

179.
See STROWEL, supra note 19, at 238; Thierry Desurmont, Le droit de
l'auteur de contr6ler la destination des exemplaires sur lesquels son ceuvre se trouve
reproduite [The Author's Right to Control the Destination of Copies Reproducing His
Work], 134 R.I.D.A. 3 (1987).
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encouragement of genius. The fate of objects important enough to be pivotal to
180
those enterprises should not be at the mercy of purely private will.

A practical effect of such an approach is a constant development of
many different methods of protecting cultural heritage. One example
is the right of certain California organizations to actively prevent
attempts to modify or destroy works of art regardless of when they
were created. Another example of this thinking is the question raised
by certain authors as to whether the right of ownership properly
protects cultural heritage. Some suggest that the concept of property
be replaced by some form of trust, which would more effectively
formulate, not just owners' rights, but also his duties.18 1 Even if these
new legal instruments or recommendations are not legally
recognized, the fact that they are put forward is symptomatic of this
trend and may indirectly lead to strengthening and widening authors'
rights, for example, by including the right of integrity.
Under presently binding regulations and pursuant to court
decisions, the only method of preventing conflicts between authors
and owners is finding a sensible compromise which recognizes the
interests of both sides. Other than the generally phrased provisions of
law, there are no unequivocal, universal principles that provide a
clear solution in each case. Often the artist's and owner's interests
compete, and often both should be protected. Therefore, a decision
should be made on a case-by-case basis taking into account all
circumstances and sometimes simply choosing the lesser damage or
evil. Furthermore, we must remember that in each case it will not be
only the owner's and artist's interests which will be considered, but
also the public's interest. Sometimes the consideration of the public
interest will operate in favor of the artist, and sometimes it will work
to the artist's detriment. For example, it will be "positive" when
public interest supports actions aimed at protecting the work in an
unchanged state; it will be "detrimental" if public interest supports
the argument that the work is to be destroyed for of public safety
reasons.
We should also observe that in a practical sense the problems
analyzed in this Article will more often pertain to a certain type of
work-those more vulnerable because of their applied nature or
perhaps because of their renowned artistic quality. The analysis will
not, for instance, apply with respect to works which are massproduced, despite the fact that they are treated as the same as other
works by legal systems in continental Europe.

180.
Sax, supra note 147, at 197-98.
181.
See Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, 'CulturalHeritage' or 'Cultural
Property?, 1 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307 (1992) (discussing why property law is
inadequate and inappropriate to protect cultural resources such as artwork).

